

REF-323-59

2 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Development Projects Division *Apel*
SUBJECT: Agency Participation in Various Guided Missiles *Wth*
Orientation Programs

25X1 1. This memorandum is prompted by a discussion on 1 June 1959
25X1 between the undersigned and [redacted], D/ER/PI, on the
subject of case officer orientation in the guided missiles field. Mr.
[redacted] had sought me out to see if this division might be able to
arrange, through its association with ARDC, a visit to the Glenn L. Martin
Plant in Denver, Colorado, of some five people from the SR Division, DD/P,
at some time this month.

25X1 2. You will recall that [redacted] enjoyed a fairly long association
25X1 with this staff when we were known as IPS/DCI, and our sole worry was the
Project CHALICE activity. At that time, [redacted] was our contact on
liaison matters, with Mr. Helms, the then-Acting DD/P, and the balance of
25X1 the DD/P complex. Knowing of our background in those days, [redacted]
sought to utilize our ARDC connections as a fulcrum for advancing the trip
mentioned above.

25X1 3. On questioning him, I discovered that he has been a prime mover
within his division in a program designed to familiarize Headquarters and
Field case officers with the shape and size of various missiles, missile
launching complexes and support activities. The aim of this effort is to
make case officer personnel knowledgeable of basic missile configurations,
basic outlines of support complexes, test facilities, etc., so that they
are better able to give intelligent appraisals to raw missile information
reaching them, either from debriefed sources in the field or through in-
terpretation of written reports received in Headquarters. I must say that
25X1 the basic aims of such a program are worthy of support. [redacted] tells
me that this general sort of program is receiving fairly widespread interest
and support in the divisions whose geographic responsibilities are peripher-
al to the Soviet Union.

25X1 4. Thus, through the continued efforts of the concerned divisions, the
Office of Training and the Office of Scientific Intelligence, an informal
orientation program in this sort of discipline seems actually well under
way. I understand that [redacted] participates, for example, through the
medium of "T" briefings of properly cleared personnel on these subjects.
The actual arrangement of "Field Trips" to selected installations in the
United States appears to be a somewhat divided responsibility, split three
ways between the division concerned, OTR and OSI. Outside of those courses
carried in the OTR curriculum, I am not aware of any central point for
25X1 this sort of orientation.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

5. [redacted] visit to solicit DPD assistance specifically concern-
ed a trip proposed for this month for a group of five SR people, himself
included, to the West Coast through SAC in Omaha, and reportedly under the

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25X1 somewhat general series of SAC, as arranged through [redacted] in AFMID. Apparently it was planned that the group, first of a like number to be sent on a quarterly basis, would visit Omaha for a one day briefing on the entire spectrum of Soviet missile capability problems, including ELINT in this area, following which they would visit Vandenberg AFB en masse, to "see for themselves." The invitation to visit Vandenberg AFB had reportedly been arranged under SAC auspices. [redacted] stated that SAC knew these people as CIA representatives, and the inference is that their appearance at Vandenberg would be under a more-or-less overt sponsorship in their true employment. The interesting feature was that [redacted] added that their due date at Vandenberg was 18 June 1959 (the date of the next CORONA shot) so that their proposed visit to the Martin Plant would, of necessity, come the day before.

25X1 5. [redacted] stated additionally that this group were not strangers to the missile field, having been to Cape Canaveral to witness firings, and to Redstone Arsenal to look in on the JUPITER production facility. Thus the Westward trip was more-or-less designed to "round out" their experience. The problem of entry into the Martin Plant appears to have arisen over the fact that ARDC controls access to this facility, in contrast to HSD control over the ATLAS Plant and Rocketdyne facilities in California, where, it might be inserted, some of this group reportedly had gone in connection with the Ballistics Missiles Division Orientation Course, local control for which lies with the Office of Training.

25X1 7. Aside from the fact that I was momentarily stunned by the prospect of an unscheduled meeting on the Vandenberg launch pad between a group of OR Division case officers and IFD representatives on Project CORONA, I was struck by the apparent lack of unity and coordination on a program of this sort. Perhaps this stems from lack of complete knowledge, but I felt not a bit reassured to discover that had it not been because of a productive and friendly relationship between myself and [redacted] this particular error might have been undetected, at least until the point of embarrassment. This sort of error I believe to be chargeable to something known as "organizational size and compartmentation." The question I really want to raise has the following facets:

- a. If the proper province of the Development Projects Division is the field of air activities that are of interest to CIA, ought not the missile field be included? After all, The Air Force regards "outer space" as a legitimate area of enterprise.
- b. If the answer above is yes, ought not IFD to be included in CIA-oriented programs which bring Agency people in official contact with missile production, test and operations facilities, at least to the extent of coordination if not central clearing house responsibility?

8. With CIA involved now and for the foreseeable future in collection of information from and about missiles, domestic and foreign, I feel that we should at the very minimum establish something of an Agency "mutual assistance program," designed to permit an orderly exploitation of domestic

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and friendly foreign sources capable of contributing to the general knowledge, not only of technical specialists, but of the larger body of relatively uninformed professional case officer and mission-type personnel apt to encounter missile data in its raw, or at least unevaluated form.

9. With this fairly general goal in mind, and as a preliminary step should the Deputy Director (Plans) approve, I would propose:

- a. Calling a meeting between yourself, The Director of Training, the Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence or the Chief, Guided Missiles Division/OSI, or both, possibly the Chief of Operations, DD/P or his representative, or a senior representative from each of the following area divisions: SR, WE, FE, EE and NE.
- b. Announced purpose of such a meeting would be (1) an examination of the requirement for missile orientation training in CIA, and (2) the best method of ensuring not only the coordination required to avoid situations like that envisioned in paragraph 7 herein, but to assign, through recommendations to the DD/P, responsibilities for effecting necessary arrangements with U.S. forces or friendly governments. To the extent that his interests would be affected, the DD/I should also be the recipient of proposals of this sort.
- c. I would also suggest that any meeting of the sort advanced herein be attended by a senior representative of the Central Cover Division, as well as the Cover Officer, IFD, since obvious problems arise in establishing official cover for visitations of the sort suggested, and since, in some cases, such cover might be at variance with cover arrangements for subsequent field assignment of the individual.

10. As a last matter of interest, the identities of the five individuals concerned with the June trip to the Martin (Denver) Plant are:

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* [] was added to the original list of five, according to []

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11. Additionally, I propose that:

- a. [] as leader of this SR contingent, be CORONA briefed.
- b. IFD attempt to arrange the visit of [] group to the Martin Plant at the time proposed, utilizing either Col. Geary

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in AFCEG-5 or such other channels as the DD/P may suggest, direct with ARDC.

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c. Cover arrangements for the travel of this group be worked out by [] with the Cover Section, IFD, with the coordination of Central Cover Division, DD/P.

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11. It is my understanding that a [] D/I of ARDC, has been suggested to [] as the contact point for travel arrangements with ARDC for the proposed visit to Martin, and that a [] D/I for Vandenberg, AFB, is the contact there for such arrangements. I believe neither should be approached until we have reached a preliminary position from a CIA point of view, following a meeting proposed in paragraph 9 herein.

SIGNED

JAMES A. CUMMINGS JR.
Chief, Administrative Branch, IFD-DD/P

cc: Original and 1 - addressees
Chief, Operations Branch, IFD
Chief, Security Section, IFD
Chief, Cover Section, IFD
✓ Assistant to the DD/P
Chief, Development Branch, IFD
D/SR/PI - []
Chief, Administrative Branch, IFD

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